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THE CONCEPT OF INCORPORATION
Earl M. Maltz*
Akhil Amar's new book' is by any standard a major contribution to the literature on the Bill of Rights. Amar skillfully combines historical research and legal analysis to give the reader a
variety of fresh, important insights into the role that the first
ten amendments have played in the evolution of the American
constitutional system. Among the many innovative concepts in
the book is Amar's treatment of the question of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to incorporate the Bill of Rights. Rejecting the traditional dogmas of both
incorporation and anti-incorporation theorists, he proposes a
new theory-"refined incorporationism"-which focuses, not on
the original understanding of the first ten amendments themselves, but rather, on the understanding of those amendments
during the Reconstruction Era.2
This essay provides an historical context for the evaluation of
the import of Amar's theory of incorporation. The essay will not
enter the debate over the widely discussed question of whether
the Fourteenth Amendment was, in fact, originally understood
to incorporate the Bill of Rights. Rather, it deals with the place
of incorporation doctrine in subsequent debates over the proper
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, the
essay focuses on the abandonment of the idea that incorporation theory can play an important role in constraining the
Court and limiting judicial activism.
Although the idea that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
incorporated the Bill of Rights was discussed extensively during
the early Reconstruction Era, the potential legal implications of
the incorporation doctrine were not explored in detail until the
debates over what was ultimately to become the Civil Rights
Act of 1875.' Beginning in 1869, radical Republican Senator
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden.
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2. See id. at 215-30.
3. The evolution of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 is described in detail in Earl M.
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Charles Sumner of Massachusetts repeatedly introduced bills
that would not only have barred racial discrimination in the
selection of jurors, but would also have outlawed racial segregation by public schools, common carriers, innkeepers, owners of
theaters, and churches. When Sumner's bill first reached the
Senate floor in early 1872, its supporters vigorously contended
that the Fourteenth Amendment vested Congress with authority
to adopt the bill. Democrats and some conservative Republicans
deployed a variety of arguments in an effort to refute this contention in whole or in part. Most often, they relied on two related contentions. First, they argued that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause distinguished between the rights associated
with national and state citizenship, respectively, and
constitutionalized only the former. Second, they contended that
Congress possessed Fourteenth Amendment authority to protect
only "civil" rights, while the Sumner bill dealt with "political"
and "social" rights.
Democratic Senator Allen G. Thurman of Ohio, however,
articulated an even more conservative interpretation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Rejecting the claim that civil
rights generally were associated with national citizenship,
Thurman argued that
[by looking] to the provisions of the Constitution, we find
what are the rights, privileges, and immunities of the people in their character of citizens of the United States. We
find them by looking at the prohibitions contained in the
Constitution against the infringement of certain rights,
privileges, and immunities which belong to the people, and
which, by these prohibitions, are recognized as rights that
belong to a citizen of the United States, and of which he
cannot be deprived.4
Among the rights specifically mentioned by Thurman were
those contained in the first eight amendments.5 In short,
Thurman essentially relied on incorporation theory to limit the
scope of Section 1.

Maltz, The Civil Rights Act and the Civil Rights Cases: Congress, Court and Constitution, 44 FLA. L. REV. 605 (1992).
4. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 25 (1872).
5. See id. app. at 25-26.
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Republican Senator John Sherman of Ohio immediately rose
to challenge Thurman. Sherman did not dispute the proposition
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause incorporated the
rights protected by the first eight amendments. Instead, he
contended that the Fourteenth Amendment also constitutionalized some rights not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, asserting that "if [Senator Thurman] will turn to the ninth
article of amendment he will see that there are other rights
beyond those recognized" and that "as the Constitution itself
did not enumerate all the rights of citizens we look to the Declaration of Independence and the common law of England."6
Sherman's reference to the Ninth Amendment added a new
dimension to the Reconstruction Era debate over the scope of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. In prior discussions of
the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Bill of Rights, influential Republicans such as Representative
John A. Bingham of Ohio and Senator Jacob M. Howard of
Michigan referred only to the incorporation of the first eight
amendments to the Constitution.! Against this background,
Thurman quickly responded to Sherman's argument:
My colleague is entirely mistaken if he supposes that these
other rights which are retained by the people [to which the
Ninth Amendment refers] are rights that appertain to them
in their character of citizens of the United States. It is true
they are rights, but they are rights which have never been
surrendered to this Government; ... The people hold them

not as citizens of the United States, but so to speak, in
despite of the United States.'
Sumner's bill was not adopted in 1872. One year later, the
Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases.9 As Amar
notes, while Justices Joseph P. Bradley and Noah Swayne ex-

6. Id. app. at 26.
7. See CONG. GLOBE,
Bingham); CONG. GLOBE,
Howard).
8. CONG. GLOBE, 42d
9. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)

42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1872) (statement of Rep.
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1765 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 26 (1872).
36 (1873).
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pressly endorsed the concept of incorporation," the import of
Justice Samuel F. Miller's majority opinion was less certain.
The majority opinion clearly gave the Privileges and Immunities Clause a very narrow reading. At the same time, while not
explicitly referring to the Bill of Rights as a whole, Miller did
cite "[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
of grievances" as an example of a right of national citizenship
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Viewed in isolation, the reference to the First Amendment
right of assembly might well be seen as supporting the doctrine
of incorporation more generally. Miller described the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship as those which "owe
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." 2 He did not describe the
right of assembly as one which owes its existence to the federal
government, but instead linked it to the privilege of habeas
corpus as another example of "rights . . . guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution."" The most plausible implication is that
the other rights explicitly guaranteed by the first eight amendments would be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as
well.
This interpretation would have fit comfortably with the context in which the Slaughter-House Cases were decided. By any
measure, Miller's interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was quite conservative; even if interpreted to incorporate the Bill of Rights, the majority opinion would have done
no more than embrace the analysis of Thurman-a conservative
Democrat. Any more limited view of his opinion, however,
would cast Miller as a reactionary whose view of the Fourteenth Amendment was more limited than that of even the
most conservative Democrats in Congress. Such an interpretation is particularly unlikely, given the fact that Miller was a
Republican, as were three of the remaining four members of his
majority.

10. See id. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 79.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, after the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases,
Democrats in Congress continued to assert that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause was coextensive with the first eight
amendments. Thus, in 1874, Senator Thomas M. Norwood of
Georgia explicitly linked this view with the Slaughter-House
Cases themselves,' 4 and Representative Roger Q. Mills of Texas also espoused the incorporation doctrine. 5 By contrast, no
one seems to have suggested that Miller's opinion threatened
the theory of incorporation.
In 1875, however, the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Cruikshank'6 dramatically changed the status of the
incorporation doctrine. Cruikshank involved a challenge to a
series of convictions obtained under section 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870-the Pool amendment. 7 The indictment on
which the convictions were based charged that the defendants
entered into a conspiracy to deprive two citizens "of African
descent and persons of color" of certain rights. 8 Some of the
counts of the indictment cited the victims' right to peaceably
assemble and to keep and bear arms. 9 Still others alleged a
conspiracy to deprive the victims of their lives and liberty without due process of law.'
Cruikshank explicitly raised an issue that had greatly disturbed the Slaughter-House Cases majority. Defining a right as
an incident of national citizenship not only limited state action,
but it also implied that Congress possessed plenary authority to
reach private action which might interfere with the exercise of
that right. Thus, any expansive interpretation of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause had the potential to dramatically alter
the balance of federalism by aggrandizing the authority of the

14. See 2 CoNG. REC. app. at 242 (1874).
15. See 2 CoNG. REC. 384 (1874).
16. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Cruikshank is discussed in detail in Earl. M. Maltz, The
Waite Court and Federal Power to Enforce the Construction Amendments, in THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE CML WAR 75, 77-78 (Jennier M. Lowe ed., 1996).
17. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548.

18. Id.
19. See id. at 551.
20. See id. at 553.
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federal government at the expense of the states. The prospect of
undue centralization of authority led even Bradley and Swayne
to abandon their previous endorsement of the incorporation
principle and to join a unanimous Court in striking down the
Cruikshank indictment."'
Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, who had joined the Court
after the Slaughter-House Cases decision, wrote the Cruikshank
opinion.' Waite began his treatment of the issues presented
by the indictment with a reaffirmation of the Slaughter-House
Cases distinction between the respective rights associated with
state and national citizenship.' He then turned to a more general discussion of his view of the nature of American federalism, declaring that "[t]he people of the United States resident
within any State are subject to two governments: one State,
and the other National; but there need be no conflict between
the two. The powers which one possesses, the other does not.
They are established for different purposes, and have separate
jurisdictions."' From a purely theoretical perspective, this vision of state/federal relations was hardly novel; indeed, it
formed the basis for Joseph Story's approach to many areas of
constitutional law, including the fugitive slave question presented in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.' In Story's hands, however, the
theory of separate, exclusive spheres of authority was most
often used as the basis for circumscribing the power of state
governments. For Waite, by contrast, it became an instrument
for restricting the scope of federal authority under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The breadth of the exclusive authority of state governments
was repeatedly emphasized in Waite's treatment of the provisions of the indictment that charged the defendants with incursions on interests protected by the Bill of Rights. Against the
background of the Slaughter-House Cases decision, his treatment of the First Amendment right of assembly is particularly
significant. The opinion declared that "[t]he right [to assembly]
was not created by the amendment; neither was its continuance

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See id. at 569.
See id. at 548.
See id. at 549.
Id. at 550.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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guaranteed, except as against congressional interference. For
their protection in its enjoyment, therefore, the people must
look to the States."' Waite then implicitly suggested that the
apparently contrary language from the Slaughter-House Cases
referred only to the right "peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances," which
he conceded to be "an attribute of national citizenship."27 He
also rejected the notion that the Second Amendment right to
bear arms was an incident of national citizenship.'
Waite viewed the counts charging the defendants with conspiring to deprive citizens of life and liberty without due process as "even more objectionable," and "nothing else than alleging a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder citizens of the
United States."' While conceding that the rights to both life
and liberty were natural rights, Waite declared that "[t]he very
highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union
under the Constitution, was to protect all persons within their
boundaries in the enjoyment of these [rights]" and that
"[s]overeignty, for this purpose, rests alone with the States.""
Based on this vision of federalism, Waite drew a sharp distinction between private action, which was left generally to state
control, and state action, which the federal government could
constitutionally control.' Thus, as Robert C. Palmer has noted,
it was the Cruikshank Court that moved away from the pure
textualist reliance on the Bill of Rights that marked both the
majority and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases
and, as we have seen, was accepted by even the most conservative members of Congress during the debate over the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.32

26. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 553.
29. Id.

30. Id.
31. See id. at 554-55.
32. See Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction:
Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv.
739, 762-70.
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At the same time, however, it would be a mistake to overstate the specific implications of this analysis for the applicability of the Bill of Rights to state action. While rejecting incorporation theory per se, Chief Justice Waite strongly reaffirmed
the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states
from interfering with pre-existing fundamental rights, asserting
that the Due Process Clause "furnishes an additional guaranty
against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental
rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society."'
He declared that:
The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to
protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if
within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the
States; and it still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States [under the Fourteenth Amendment] is to see that the States do not deny the right. This
the amendment guarantees, but no more.'

Rather plainly, Waite viewed rights such as those protected
by the First Amendment and the Second Amendment right to
bear arms, as the kind of fundamental rights that would be
protected under this analysis. At the same time, some of the
technical requirements codified in the Bill of Rights might not
be viewed as rising to the same level of fundamentality. If the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had focused specifically
on questions such as the right to indictment by a grand jury
prior to trial in a criminal case, they might plausibly have
viewed these matters as less important than the substantive
interests protected by other aspects of the first eight amendments. Thus, Cruikshank might well be viewed as a precursor
of the doctrine of "selective incorporation," combined with a
commitment to the protection of some other, unspecified rights
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. Despite the efforts
of Justices John Marshall Harlan and Stephen Field, it was
this vision which took hold of the Court in the early twentieth
century.

33. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554.
34. Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
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The Cruikshank decision also had long-term implications for
the perception of the incorporation doctrine. Prior to 1875, the
theory of incorporation was not viewed as necessarily linked to
a broad vision of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, to some it was an intrinsic element of a textualist theory
designed to limit the scope of Section 1 and preserve state autonomy. By contrast, in the ninety years following Cruikshank,
incorporationists were almost invariably cast as defenders of an
expansive view of Section 1 and a concomitant aggrandizement
of federal power at the expense of state independence.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, the implications of this role changed. Cruikshank dealt with
the scope of congressional power. Thus, a broad interpretation
of Section 1 necessarily implied a more limited judicial role.
After Cruikshank, the focus of the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence changed. Rather than dealing with federal
legislative power, the cases generally dealt with Section 1 as a
limitation on state authority. In this context, expansive views of
the Fourteenth Amendment were synonymous with judicial
activism.
The import of the changes wrought by Cruikshank were
clearly apparent in the famous Adamson case. 5 There, Justice
Hugo Black sought to revive the argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights.36 In responding,
Justice Stanley Reed declared that the analysis of Cruikshank
and its progeny "has become embedded in our federal system as
a functioning element in preserving the balance between national and state power" and suggested that incorporationist
theory was inconsistent with "the constitutional doctrine of
federalism."37 Justice Felix Frankfurter went even further, contending that the Fourteenth Amendment "should not be imprisoned in what are merely legal forms even though they have the
sanction of the Eighteenth Century" and defending a theory of
interpretation based upon "those canons of decency and fairness
35. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
36. See id. at 68-123 (Black, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 53.
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which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples ....

Black's rejoinder was reminiscent of Senator Allen Thurman's
response to Senator John Sherman in 1872. Sherman claimed
that the privileges and immunities of citizenship protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment were to be found in the Declaration
of Independence and the common law of England. Thurman,
however, saw grave dangers in looking beyond the text of the
Constitution itself:
Every right, every privilege, every immunity that belongs to
a man as a citizen of the United States is found in the
Constitution. If not, where are we to find them? Where are
we able to find a definition of them? [One Senator] finds
the definition in the Declaration of Independence; another
Senator finds it in something else; and so on to the end of
the chapter; and we have nothing certain, nothing definite,
nothing
upon which any man can rely. Sir, that will not
39
do.

Similarly, in responding to Reed and Frankfurter, Black stated that
[i]t is an illusory apprehension that literal application of
some or all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the
States would unwisely increase the sum total of the powers
of this Court to invalidate state legislation ....

It must be

conceded, of course, that the natural-law-due-process formula, which the Court today reaffirms, has been interpreted to
limit substantially this Court's power to prevent state violations of the individual civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. But this formula also has been used in the past,
and can be used in the future, to license this Court

...

to

roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals
and to trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain of
the States as well as the Federal Government. 0
In short, like Allen Thurman before him, Black clearly
viewed incorporation theory largely as a device to provide

38. Id. at 66, 67 (Frankfirter, J., concurring).
39. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d. Sess. app. at 26 (1872).
40. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 90 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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strong constraints on the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He also understood and intended incorporationism
to restrict the potential scope of federal judicial activism. Initially, however, the critics of Black's jurisprudence almost uniformly characterized incorporationism as a philosophy of judicial
activism that would unduly constrain the options of state governments. 41 Given the context in which Black made his arguments, such characterizations were not surprising. In the criminal procedure cases that figured so prominently in Warren
Court jurisprudence, the positions of Black and William 0.
Douglas-the Court's most vociferous advocates of incorporationist theory-were consistently more activist than those of
Frankfurter and his ideological soul mate, the second Justice
Harlan. Moreover, the Lochner era practice of using the Due
Process Clause to aggressively protect a wide variety of substantive, nontextual rights was denounced by all of the justices.
Thus, from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, it seemed certain
that the abandonment of incorporationism would lead to a more
restrained approach to judicial review generally.
Beginning in 1965, however, it became clear that the concerns which Black expressed in Adamson were far from illusory.
Over Black's strenuous objections, the Court held in Griswold v.
Connecticut42 that a state prohibition on the use of contracep-

tives ran afoul of the Due Process Clause. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Douglas sought to avoid the charge of reviving
Lochner-style jurisprudence by relying on what he described as
the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights.43 Nonetheless, it was
clear to all dispassionate observers that the Griswold result
could not be persuasively justified in incorporationist terms.
Eight years later, in Roe v. Wade," the Court abandoned all
pretense of relying on the Bill of Rights by placing stringent
constitutional restraints on state authority to regulate access to
abortions.
41. See generally, Francis A. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950).

42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. See id. at 484-85.
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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The activism inherent in decisions such as Griswold and Roe
has drawn its share of criticism. A number of critics take the
originalist view that the Court should constitutionalize only the
specific rights that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood to be protected by Section 1." In a different context, one might well expect these critics to be attracted by theories such as those advocated by Thurman and Black. By the
1970s, however, incorporationist theory was indissolubly connected with judicial activism in the minds of the justices and
most scholars. This link was only strengthened by activist decisions extending provisions of the Bill of Rights well beyond the
original understanding-decisions that are also marked by a
clear political bias.' Thus, references to incorporation became
simply one of the devices used by those seeking to create a
regime of liberal activism. Against this background, it should
not be surprising that originalists have often been the harshest
critics of arguments seeking to link the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights."
Amar reminds us that incorporationist theory can, in fact, be
a vehicle to provide strong constraints on judicial interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. One need not agree with all of
the conclusions in The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction to appreciate Amar's intellectual candor and willingness to
subordinate his political preconceptions to principled legal analysis. His careful treatment of the right to bear arms is particularly admirable in this regard. In short, constitutional scholars
and judges-liberal and conservative, supporters of activism and
restraint-would do well to follow his example in their treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment.

45. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1971); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989).
46. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (holding that the existing methods of imposing the death penalty violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
47. See, e.g.,

RIGHTS (1989).
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